






CYNTHIA DAMON AND CHRISTOPH PIEPER 
 
 
1. The Omnipresence of Competition 
 
Princeps litterarum Homerus. Pliny the Elder’s assessment of Homer (HN 2.13) is broadly 
representative, but in the case of eris primacy goes to Hesiod. Although Homer offers some 
striking commentary on strife in his epics, it is Hesiod’s Works and Days account of the two 
Erides, one harmful and one beneficial, that has been crucial for almost all later discussions.1 
By splitting the goddess into two separate (almost psychological) entities Hesiod presents her 
as the expression of polarisation itself.2 The drive to differentiate between good and bad 
strife, and consequently between positive and negative evaluations of competition in a 
broader sense, is central to our volume.3 Its title is ‘Eris vs. aemulatio’, but it would also have 
been possible to call it ‘Eris vs. eris’, for in the papers presented here competition appears in 
various forms that are differentiated not by their cultural context in the ancient world—Greek 
vs. Roman—but by their cultural value. 
                                               
1 For a general treatment of Eris in Homer, Hesiod, and the Greek historiographers see Thalmann 2004.  
2 Darthou 2008, 272: ‘une divinité construite en polarité et expression d’une polarité’.  
3 See, for example, Oostenbroek 1977, who identifies two separate traditions of ancient discourse about Eris: a 
poetic one and a philosophical-scientific one. 
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 It is hardly necessary to argue for the relevance of the topic of competition in the field 
of classical studies. On the contrary, competition is everywhere in the Greco-Roman world. 
The following list, far from complete, suggests its range. The Roman aristocracy in 
republican times was endlessly competitive in pursuit of political authority and glory (in fact 
Caesar’s famous dictum that he was ‘harder to push from the first rank to the second than 
from the second to the last’, quoted by Suetonius, Iul. 29.1, is not so exceptional within the 
superlative-laden self-presentation of Roman aristocrats).4 Philosophers including Plato and 
Aristotle developed critiques of the omnipresent competition in the society that surrounded 
them; thus Plato’s attempt to control strife by virtue, i.e., to root out ‘bad’ Eris and to retain 
only the competition for aretê, fits the general interest of fifth- and fourth-century Athenian 
society, which understood the importance of competition for the functioning of their 
democracy but also feared the possibility of strife getting out of control and leading to 
internal struggle or even civil war (stasis).5 Religion was an important place of agonistic 
rivalry, not only when new cults were imported (as is attested in Euripides’ Bacchae or 
Rome’s struggles with the cult of Magna Mater) but also in the combative invective deployed 
between pagan and Christian thinkers in late antiquity.6 Literary texts from all periods 
struggled with their models in order to emulate them, which makes competition one of the 
most creative literary concepts of all times.7 Greek drama is defined by its agonistic 
                                               
4 Cf., e.g., Neel 2014, who argues for the centrality of doublings and dyadic competition in Roman 
historiography about the (early) republic as a means both to acknowledge and mitigate competition (‘a way to 
think about competition that was at the same time free from competition itself’, 237). 
5 Cf., inter alia, Ober 2008, esp. 80-117 (ch. 3: ‘Competition, Scale, and Varieties of Knowledge’). 
6 See two recent volumes: Engels and Van Nuffelen (eds.) 2014, and Des Rosiers and Vuong (eds.) 2016. 
7 See, among innumerable examples, Collins 2004, esp. 63-163 for an instructive overview of differences 
between rhapsodic and symposiastic competition, and the important study of Griffith 1990; for Roman poetry 
see, e.g., Barchiesi 1991. Ch. 5 in the seminal book by Hinds 1998 deals with authorial self-fashioning via 
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performance context and (if we think of Aristophanes’ comedies) became an important 
medium in which to reflect on the social energy of strife.8 Artists and poets competed with 
each other to win the favor of the audience and—more specifically—the patronage of the 
upper class or ideally the ruler.9 Art itself was closely connected with the theme of 
competition: a substantial percentage of the numerous statues that stood in imperial Greek or 
Roman cities were those of successful athletes, another group being those of triumphant 
generals and other members of the elite who had earned them as prizes in their competition 
for glory.10 Festivals and public games with their acclaimed contests are a well studied and 
obvious kind of competition with a primarily positive evaluation in antiquity,11 but festival 
competition also served as a metaphor structuring discourse in other ‘arenas’, among them 
sophistic rhetoric in classical Greece.12 And the vectors of competition ramify when Greek 
and Latin intellectuals of the imperial period known as the ‘Second Sophistic’ compete with 
each other in the act of competing with the models of a classical period.13  
                                                                                                                                                  
intertextuality; ch. 5 (on ‘writing as social performance’) in Habinek 1998 is concerned with competitive self-
fashioning through publishing one’s texts. See also below on the creative and cohesive potential of competition 
in literary production. 
8 On Aristophanes see Biles 2011.  
9 See Nauta 2002.  
10 See for a broad overview Smith 2012. 
11 See, inter alia, Christesen and Kyle (eds.) 2014; Coleman and Nelis-Clément (eds.) 2012, and Fisher 2009 for 
a succinct summary of the infrastructure of competition and its development in archaic and classical Greek 
culture. 
12 See Poulakos 1995, 32-46. 
13 Schmitz 1997, 97-135 is seminal for the Second Sophistic. For a more critical, almost Platonic, view of the 
utility of competition in imperial Greek literature see Stadter 2011 (on Plutarch); on Plutarchan philotimia more 
generally see the volume edited by Roskam, De Pourcq, and Van der Stockt (eds.) 2012.  
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 Given the omnipresence of competition in the Greco-Roman world, its salience as a 
topic for scholarly investigation shows surprising fluctuations. If one searches for the English 
term “competition” in the Année philologique, for example, 44 of the 368 hits date from 
before 1980, 269 are from after 1990. Christoph Ulf (2011), after sketching the huge impact 
the concept had on 19th-century philology,14 shows how it lost the attention of 20th-century 
scholarship, especially in the English-speaking world, and only regained influence in the 
1980s. In the last fifteen years, in addition to numerous studies on competition in individual 
authors, genres, institutions, or contexts (some of which are mentioned en passant in this 
introduction), several important collected volumes have appeared, which—like the present 
volume—examine competition in broader temporal and spatial contexts and pave ways for a 
new understanding of the dynamics of competition in antiquity.  
The volume edited by Nick Fisher and Hans van Wees (2011) is especially useful for 
the anthropological focus of Hans van Wees’ introduction, which encompasses more than the 
traditional purview of classics and includes discussions of African societies and Neolithic 
large-scale architecture. He concludes that one can move beyond economic or political 
models in explaining the competitive structures of ancient societies, and suggests instead that 
‘competitiveness is essentially social, and that its primary goal is superior status’ (24).  
As its title La pomme d’Éris suggests, the volume edited by Hélène Ménard, Pierre 
Sauzeau, and Jean François Thomas (2012) concentrates on the conflictual aspects of 
competition as manifest in language, concept, story, and between and within ancient 
societies, Greco-Roman and beyond. A topic treated by many of the Pomme d’Éris papers of 
                                               
14 Ulf thinks that John Stuart Mill’s utilitarian theories are foundational for this interest, a fascination that 
culminates in Jacob Burckhardt’s influential Griechische Culturgeschichte, in which the concept of the ‘agonal’ 
is defined as the core of Greek society.  
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particular relevance for the present volume, with its interest in the mechanisms by which 
competition is constrained, is the return to harmony and homonoia after conflict.  
A decade earlier David Konstan and Keith Rutter (2003) edited a volume of studies 
on the emotions that trigger rivalry and competition, namely, envy, spite, and jealousy. Its 
essays explore these emotions in Greco-Roman philosophical doctrine, literary depiction, and 
oratorical deployment, and with attention to the question of their universality.  
For a broad overview of how the concept of competition has been used in historical 
analysis one can now turn to Konkurrenz in der Geschichte. Praktiken, Werte, 
Institutionalisierungen (2014), edited by Ralph Jessen, to which Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp 
contributes a useful essay—both general and easily applicable to the ancient world—focused 
on competitive practices, mores, and institutions. Of particular note is the volume’s interest in 
the spread of an economic perspective on competition beyond the market to other areas of 
human endeavor.  
 The first sentence of Hans van Wees’ (2011, 1) above-mentioned authoritative 
introduction to ancient competition is ‘Competition divides people’. This beginning might 
seem to imply that, no matter whether societies foster competition or discourage it (ibid. 28), 
the outcome is always a rupture of social cohesion. Yet it remains disputable whether this is 
true for all kinds of ancient competition and in all respects. Institutionalized competitions, for 
example, such as the dramatic agônes at Athens, or spectacular Roman funerals with 
processions and tombs that try to outdo those of other families, may divide the competitors, 
but they also display shared values and encourage a sense of community in the audience. Van 
Wees himself acknowledges this fully and eventually describes competition as part of the 
sociability of humans in general (ibid. 6).  
When it comes to the classical Greco-Roman world, literary texts are the primary (but 
by no means only) sources that reveal the sociability that is achieved through competition. 
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However, literature does not only (implicitly or explicitly) reflect competition, it is also 
profoundly competitive itself. So it is worth stressing that the interactions between texts and 
their ‘surrounding’ culture are by no means unidirectional. Instead, ever since Foucault’s 
discourse analysis, literature has been described as a formative part of culture in that it is, in 
the words of Leslie Kurke, ‘a domain of contest and negotiation.’ Or, put differently: texts 
shape culture through discursive, contested patterns.15 
Even within the boundaries of literature itself, competition helped position any 
author’s literary product in the ‘crowded market’ in which many conflicting voices were 
fighting for attention (Barker and Christensen 2006, 14). Elton Barker and Joel Christensen 
haven shown in two important contributions (2006 and 2011) how intergeneric contestation is 
already visible in Homer.16 Epic, sympotic, and cultic language and narrative patterns were 
interrelated from the very beginning of our written literary sources, and the interaction 
between them fostered literary originality.17 Poets tried to develop their distinct ‘personal 
voice’ (Barker and Christensen 2006, 15) within a ‘playful sympotic world’ (ibid. 31). This 
                                               
15 Kurke 2011, 24, who continues: ‘Thus texts of all kinds offer us the sedimented residue of moments in a 
dynamic process of struggle or contestation’. 
16 Jauss 1977, 327-358 is still worth reading for a theory of genres in pre-modern societies; on page 327 he 
stresses that vernacular medieval literature is an especially promising field of studies in that the distinction 
between authorial singularity and collectivity has not yet been fixed (‘[ein] Versuchsfeld …, das zwischen den 
Gegensätzen von Singularität und Kollektivität, von reinem Kunstcharakter und bloßer Zweckbedingtheit der 
Literatur liegt’). A similarly fluid infrastructure can be also assumed for early Greek poetry. On the utility of 
Jauss’ genre theory for classical studies see Harrison 2013, 7. 
17 Barker 2011 shows how Homer’s Iliad engages with allegedly existing versions of the Theban cycle, 
incorporating and changing its material in order to ‘build up its own [sc. the Iliad’s] pre-eminence’ (38). 
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means that already the princeps litterarum Homer is not only the target of literary aemulatio 
but also the protagonist of poetic eris.18  
The competitive nature of literary infrastructure in early Greece was good for all 
parties: for the audience, in that the poet’s rivalry produced innovative poetry, and for the 
poets, in that better poetry helped to foster and even augment the audience’s interest in 
poetry. And emulative contestation remained omnipresent and fruitful in literature throughout 
antiquity. In cases where literary and personal rivalry overlap, the resulting competition may 
become slightly more complex but can still show astonishing cohesive effects.19  
A speaking example for this stems from the field of Latin oratory. When Cicero in 46 
BCE writes his Brutus, a history of Roman eloquence, he compares two exponents for every 
generation of orators; the two ‘compete’ for primacy not only as individuals against each 
other but also as a pair against the oratorical reputations of previous and subsequent 
generations.20 His own generation is represented by Hortensius and himself. In the passages 
dealing with Hortensius’s rhetoric Cicero is rather critical of his rival, implicitly declaring 
himself to be the victor (and thus the culmination of oratory in Rome). Yet this competitive 
rivalry with Hortensius finds a counterpart in the preface of the dialogue, where Cicero 
stresses not the well known rivalry between the two but their close connection (Brut. 1). 
Indeed he suggests that Hortensius’s recent death deprives him of a necessary condition of 
oratorical competition, i.e., a worthy competitor, ‘not an adversary or detractor of my fame 
but rather a comrade and partner in a glorious struggle’ (non … adversarium aut 
                                               
18 See also the stimulating book by Levaniouk 2011, esp. 324-325 on the challenging task of defining the 
‘context’ for the dialogue between Penelope and Odysseus in Iliad 19: it is Homer’s narrative, of course, but 
also ‘a landscape of tradition, or rather, of many cooperating and competing traditions that contribute to the 
formation of the Homeric epic’: other epic poetry, myth, cult, lament, etc. 
19 Simmel 1992, 284-382 (‘Der Streit’) is still fundamental; see recently Hölkeskamp 2014, 34-38.  
20 For more discussion of such fictive competitions see Ham, de Jonge, and Zadorozhnyi in this volume.  
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obtrectatorem laudum mearum sed socium potius et consortem gloriosi laboris, Brut. 2).21 
The simultaneous presence of and tension between divisive and cohesive effects visible in 
this passage and in many of those that are discussed in this volume is reflected in our title, 
Eris vs. aemulatio. 
 
 
2. Defining and Evaluating Competition 
 
Competition, in addition to being omnipresent, is also multifaceted, a factor that complicates 
its definition and evaluation; it will become clear that defining competition always requires 
two or more different perspectives on each of its main features, depending on whether it is 
viewed as primarily beneficial or harmful. In what follows, therefore, our cumulative 
definition of competition in the Greco-Roman world is interwoven with reflections about 
ancient evaluations of its characteristics.  
 According to the Oxford Dictionary of English (2010, ad loc.), competition is ‘the 
activity or condition of striving to gain or win something by defeating or establishing 
superiority over others’. The lexicographer, like Hesiod in the famous passage about good 
Eris and bad Eris that is something of a leitmotiv in this volume, makes doubling central to 
the concept: activity or condition, gain or win, defeating or establishing superiority, others 
and (implicitly) self. The only singleton here is the prize, the ‘something’. 
                                               
21 Cf. Bakewell in this volume on Plato confronting the problem of ‘how to transform an individual’s striving 
for renown into something that will benefit rather than harm the broader community’ and, more abstractly, the 
Platonic distinction cited by Marlein van Raalte (per litteras) ‘between (A) φιλονικία between human rivals — 
in which case the one (party) may become the better of the other — and (B) φιλονικία as the (ideally) common 
strife to find the truth through dialectics, in which case victory is on the part of λόγος (e.g., Gorg. 505e4–5)’.  
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 The prize is a focusing device.22 Xenophon expresses this well in the Memorabilia: 
“thinking the same things beautiful and pleasant, they fight and oppose one another in rivalry 
over them” (τά τε γὰρ αὐτὰ καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα νομίζοντες ὑπὲρ τούτων μάχονται καὶ 
διχογνωμονοῦντες ἐναντιοῦνται, Mem. 2.6.21). In fact, Georges-Jean Pirault has stressed that 
the similarity of the Greek terms for ‘prize’, ἆθλον, and ‘contest’, ἆθλος, suggests that, in 
Greece at least, a contest without prizes would be unthinkable. But prizes come in all shapes 
and sizes. They can be quantifiable or symbolic (or both), winner-take-all or extensible, 
lasting or ephemeral, gained or won, and so on. Not surprisingly, the nature of the prize 
(especially, perhaps, its scarcity), and the nature of the competition itself (does it involve 
defeating or establishing superiority?23) are generally linked: for a philosopher such as 
Aristotle, for example, as Christopher Gill (2003, 36) has shown, the ultimate external prize, 
honor, should result from the highest internal quality, magnanimity.  
The prizes discussed in the present volume range from the concrete (a vessel, an 
animal, a marriage, the spoils of war) to the conceptual (honor, status, pride, memory). The 
connection between the prize and the underlying ideology is particularly salient in the funeral 
games of Iliad 23, discussed by Bierl, where some of Achilles’ awards complicate the 
meaning of victory and call into question the efficacy of competition itself as method of 
ranking. But it is also evident in the exhortation that concludes Plato’s Republic, cited by 
Bakewell: Socrates urges his interlocutors to ‘collect the prizes (ἆθλα) of justice and be led 
around like victors (νικηφόροι)’ (621c7-d1); these are no ordinary prizes. Ideology is 
likewise fundamental to the ‘moralized critiques of short-order wealth’ discussed by Bernard. 
An unambiguously negative attitude towards prizes is on view in Kuin’s paper on Aristotle’s 
                                               
22 For a sound treatment and for parallels in Vedic hymns see Pinault 2006.  
23 See van Wees 2011, 2 for the prize as the distinguishing feature between competitions oriented towards 
gaining objects or goods and those oriented towards gaining superiority or glory.  
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critique of a proposal by Hippodamus of Miletus to establish a competition to encourage 
political innovation: giving prizes for new laws, even if the innovation was beneficial, would 
destabilize the polis, regardless of the nature of the prize. The immaterial prizes that result 
from less structured competitions—the slightly malign pleasure one imagines in those 
responsible for the graphic or lexicographical ‘capping’ discussed by Steiner and Zadorojnyi, 
for example, or the family brand promoted by Tertia Aemilia in the female status competition 
discussed by Webb, or the cultural pride in seeing ‘your’ orator ranked above ‘theirs’, as in 
the fictive competitions between Demosthenes and Cicero discussed by de Jonge—seem to 
be less problematic for society. 
 Next, the competitors. In the simplest scenario the other is much like oneself. A hero 
vies with another hero one-on-one, for example, and a bucolic singer with another bucolic 
singer. But other contests of like-on-like are multilateral: thus liturgists vie with liturgists, 
professionals with other professionals, their antitechnitai, and Roman elite men and women 
with their peers. Also relevant is the so-called N-effect, which captures the idea that the more 
numerous the competitors (=N), the lower the quality and intensity of the competition (Garcia 
and Tor, 2009).  
Here again the papers in the present volume put pressure on the definition with useful 
results. Bierl, for example, acknowledges Homer’s ‘sportscaster-like’ focus on one-on-one 
competitions in the chariot race but highlights the disconcerting effect of Achilles’ award of 
prizes to heroes, such as Nestor, who were not competitors. Plato, as Bakewell shows, is even 
more sparing in his celebration of the competitors ranked ‘golden’ in Kallipolis, emphasizing 
instead the brotherhood of Kallipolis’s citizens. Furthermore, the temporal reference of the 
gerunds ‘defeating’ and ‘establishing superiority over’ is remarkably flexible. In the elite 
status competitions discussed by Bernard and Webb, for example, the rivals are both 
contemporaries (such as the consuls of 293 BCE) and temporally disjunct generations (such as 
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Quinta Claudia and Clodia Metelli); intergenerational rivalry is of course a staple of ancient 
thinking, as in the example from Cicero's Brutus mentioned above. The degree to which 
differences between competitors align with other social or cultural divisions has a major 
impact on the stakes of a competition, as Rosen shows in his discussion of the heated rhetoric 
of physicians’ rivalry with ‘religious healers, drug-sellers, and a variety of medical poseurs’. 
A specific category of ‘different’ is on view in the literary rivalries discussed by Baraz, Ham, 
de Jonge, and Zadorojnyi. Literary predecessors worthy of emulation are often temporally 
and culturally distant, but because the emulator wants to align himself with the predecessor, 
they are also close and significant, whether the emulation be direct or vicarious. Such 
rivalries are often therefore rather emotional, as well. Indeed in the bucolic genre, as Baraz 
argues, the frustrations of rivalry with generic predecessors generate an attempt to destroy the 
genre itself. The frustrations with the inherently unequal contest between patron and 
craftsman for architectural glory discussed by Siwicki, on the other hand, lead to ingenious 
and successful changes of venue.  
 The definition’s ‘activity’ and ‘condition’ categories, too, cover a lot of semantic 
territory, ranging from the hotly contested chariot race discussed by Bierl, to the ‘placement-
dependent eristic word play’ discussed by Steiner, in which each successive writer aims to 
have ‘the last word’, and on to the ‘collaborative creativity’ constitutive of the bucolic 
contests discussed by Baraz. The categories also needs to make room for the indirection of 
contests such as those in Plato’s Kallipolis, discussed by Bakewell, where competition was a 
form of testing and the real winner was the polis itself, not the individual whose characteristic 
‘metal’ was deemed to be gold. 
 So far we have mostly exemplified some features of competition highlighted by the 
Oxford Dictionary of English. Useful as the definition is, however, it elides several features 
that were important in ancient competitions. First the framework within which the contestants 
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engage their rivals, be it institutional, literary, or social. Agreeing on rules means setting 
boundaries for otherwise unbounded competition. When eris is transformed and sublimated 
into an agonistic game, it is of crucial importance that the players agree on the following 
questions:24 What are the rules of the game? How explicit are they? Are they fair? Are they 
binding? Is the contest recurrent or once-in-a-lifetime? Who is in the audience? and Is defeat 
survivable? Furthermore, the legitimacy of any victory depends in large part on the 
framework of the competition, as does its impact on the community.25  
A number of the papers in this volume consider the role and evaluation of ancient 
frameworks real and metaphorical. The dramatic competitions at Athens naturally loom large. 
Taplin looks at how Aristotle delegitimizes the civic framework, while Bakewell shows Plato 
using it as a metaphor for literary criticism when Adeimantus and Glaucon adopt the role of 
‘gatekeepers’ to the competition, saying that they ‘will not give a chorus’ to an author whose 
work they consider harmful to the city. The potential for harm to the city likewise motivates 
Aristotle’s rejection, discussed by Kuin, of a proposal to establish a formal competition in 
political innovation. A similarly conservative attitude towards the potentially disruptive effect 
of competition is discussed by Webb, who shows how an important field of women’s 
competition, namely, ‘the conspicuous display of elite female transport and adornment’, was 
at one point restricted by law at Rome. The framework of the bucolic song contest is of 
central concern to Baraz’s paper as she traces the increasingly explicit tension between 
                                               
24 Hölkeskamp 2010, 103. Sublimation is particularly evident in the bucolic poems discussed by Baraz, in the 
which song contest proper is preceded by a free-form squabble: ‘the contest is a means of resolving the conflict 
by providing transition to a different sphere’.  
25 For the importance of consensus about the rules of political competition in republican Rome see Hölkeskamp 
2010, 103. Whether one stresses competition or cooperation as the core of Roman political culture seems a 
question of taste; see Russell 2013, 101-115 for a nuanced view on the practical challenges and opportunities 
that the rivalrous mode of Roman politics inflicted on the tribunes of people in Rome. 
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amoebean exchange and the more adversarial real-world competitions to which the poems 
allude (single combat, trials, athletic games). Scodel, on the other hand, discusses some 
examples of socially constructive competition in Homer, where the rivalry is carefully 
bounded by pre-existing conditions such as relationships (Nausicaa and her attendants, 
Telemachus and his father) or circumstances (the imminence of battle); informal frameworks 
such as these, or the economic markets discussed by Scodel and Bernard, or the ethical codes 
discussed by Rosen and Zadorojnyi, are as important to consider in assessing ancient attitudes 
to competition as their more formal real-world and literary counterparts. 
 Another feature elided in the definition quoted above is the judges, whose importance 
was already stressed by Hesiod: Sonia Darthou (2008, 273) observes that in Theogony the 
verb krinein, ‘to distinguish’ or ‘to judge’, often appears in close connection to eris. The 
institution of judges can be seen as an attempt to control the forces of rupture and aggression 
by shifting the competition so that it is not (or not only) directed against the fellow 
competitor but (or but also) towards the judging third, making success in the eyes of the 
judges the ultimate aim of the competitor, not the wish to defeat the opponent.  
Who, then are the judges? As the papers presented here show, some contests are 
judged by experts, some by authority figures, and some by the crowd—and the future is the 
ultimate arbiter. But the judges do not escape criticism; it becomes clear that they (and their 
critics) have their own stakes in the outcome of the contest. The clearest example of the 
expert judge comes in Zadorojnyi’s paper on Pollux’s Onomasticon, in which the sophist 
assumes the role of judge (but also competitor!) in the ‘competition for control over 
language’, a competition in which the philological prize often goes to ‘the more ambitious 
usage’. The experts’ stake is even clearer in de Jonge’s paper on fictive competitions between 
Demothenes and Cicero, a favorite exercise with critics, who, if Greek, subtly give the palm 
to Demosthenes, while Quintilian boldly promotes the claims of his fellow Roman Cicero. 
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The critique of rival judges is particularly explicit in a passage from Aristotle’s Poetics 
discussed in Taplin’s paper on the philosopher’s scorn for dramatic victories that were 
awarded on the basis of crowd-pleasing opsis, ‘spectacle’, rather than a play’s other 
components, which Aristotle considered more germane to poiêsis. Aristotle, it emerges, sets 
himself up as an alternative prize-giver, one who can bestow esteem, if not victory, on 
playwrights he admires. The problematic audience returns in Baraz’s paper on the 
development of the bucolic genre from Theocritus to Calpurnius Siculus. In the latest poems 
the audience has mushroomed from a passerby into ‘the entire locality at every level’ amid 
quarrels about the proper locus of aesthetic judgment. In his discussion of physicians’ appeals 
for expert and popular approbation alike Rosen shows how the judges’ task was complicated 
by the lack of clear criteria for success: the claims of medical efficacy, money, 
professionalism, panache, and altruism are all heard. Whereas Rosen’s doctors are primarily 
focused on contemporary judges, Siwicki’s architects, competing with the political elite in a 
contest they could not win, turned to the future as the ultimate arbiter: viewers of the funerary 
monuments on which architects asserted their claims to renown for their buildings and, even 
more ambitiously, readers of the De Architectura, a treatise in which Vitruvius gave credit to 
architects, not rulers, for notable buildings.  
Finally, it is worth mentioning the emotions with which competition is associated.26 
Underneath the definition’s terms ‘striving’, ‘defeating’, and ‘superiority’ passions roil. 
Hesiod mentions several emotions from the negative spectrum, including resentment and 
jealousy, and Scodel explains how they work in context, but competition can also generate 
positive emotions such as hope (in those who look to the future as arbiter) and even exaltation 
(some of Steiner’s graffiti could have been printed with exclamation marks: ‘Enpedokles 
                                               
26 See Thalmann 2004, 380 on the emotions: For ‘rivalry, jealousy, and hatred are potentially by-products of any 
form that eris, seen as a unity, might take, from war to athletic or economic competition’. 
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carved these things And he danced, by Apollo!’ or ‘Pheidip(p)idas fucked. Timagoras and 
Enperes and I—we fucked too!’). The ancients were attentive to the emotional concomitants 
of competition at its extreme: the anger of Antilochus, discussed by Bierl, the shame that 
Cicero, as Webb shows, wanted to (pretend to) arouse in Clodia Metelli, the hatred that one 
of Rosen’s physicians actually did want to arouse against a rival quack, the personal abuse 
between sophists that, as Zadorojnyi shows, Pollux disapproved of, and the furor and insania 
mentioned by Calpurnius Siculus and discussed by Baraz. One can certainly find attempts to 
limit competition’s social cost by moving the competition inward, or even by encouraging 
competition with an abstraction or with oneself instead of with others. As Scodel observes, ‘it 
is the peculiarity of the competition in work and thus in success that the competition is 
mainly in the mind of the competitor’. Seneca, who draws an explicit analogy between 
athletic competition and the development of the inner self, shows something of the dynamics 
(Ep. 13.3): ‘Thus, to pursue that analogy, Fortune often got the better of you, but you did not 
surrender; rather, you leapt up and made a more determined stand. For virtue, when 
challenged, makes itself greater’ (ergo, ut similitudinem istam prosequar, saepe iam fortuna 
supra te fuit, nec tamen tradidisti te, sed subsiluisti et acrior constitisti; multum enim adicit 
sibi virtus lacessita). On a larger scale, stasis threatens, and, apropos of Plato’s stasis-
reducing provisions for Kallipolis, Bakewell argues that ‘the city’s success hinges on its 
ability to limit and manage competition on multiple levels’. 
 
 
3. Representational Competition 
 
We can go a step further in supplementing the dictionary definition by considering the degree 
to which competition is real or representational, an aspect of competition that is often crucial 
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for its evaluation. Being confronted with unregulated strife might be unsettling, but seeing it 
staged or perceiving it in artistic or literary representations can have a pedagogical effect. The 
contrast between representation (e.g., in the theater at Athens or at panhellenic festivals) and 
reality (e.g., the stubborn competitiveness of political leaders who led Roman citizens to take 
up arms against each other in the course of the first century BCE) is stark. The tension 
between these paradigms was at the core of philosophical warnings against competition such 
as those issued by Plato or, even more radically, by the Stoics and Epicureans.27 Yet not even 
Plato can dismiss competition completely. Bakewell explores Plato’s intriguing 
representation of competition in the Republic against the backdrop of Athenian society, 
especially the opportunities of social ascent for residents who by birth were not likely to 
become political players. On the other hand, real life can also make philosophers deeply 
sceptical about the usefulness of even institutionalized and representational competition, as 
Taplin shows with regard to Aristotle’s critique of opsis in his Poetics. 
 What do we mean by representational? In a fascinating study Elton Barker (2009, 
372) remarks with regard to the Athenian context that ‘Representations of debate ... 
reproduce dissent from authority and help construct an agonistic mentality by which one may 
perform as a citizen’.28 His observation brings to the fore several important aspects of 
representational competition.  
 First, the notion of authority. Authoritative models from the past who engaged in 
strife can serve as legitimation and inspiration for later competitors in setting up their own 
agonistic game. In the field of literature, for example, Ham shows how Ovid reworked 
Hesiod’s doubling of Eris in his Metamorphoses and Fasti and developed it as a source of 
                                               
27 See the useful overview in Gill 2003. 




poetic invention, while de Jonge’s chapter on imperial rhetoricians concludes that their fictive 
agôn about the models of Greek and Roman prose invites the latter generation to respond in 
an emulative way to the challenges offered by past perfection. But contemporary authorities 
(both individuals and institutions), too, can legitimate competition. Who is authoritative 
enough to judge (or end) competition or to set its rules and boundaries? We have already seen 
that Aristotle presents himself as such an authority in the Poetics. In Siwicki’s paper we 
encounter architects who challenge the authority of political leaders on the field of 
representative architecture and claim their own aesthetic authority and responsibility, but we 
also find their wish to co-operate in a client-patron relationship. Within the boundaries of the 
text, Bierl’s chapter shows how Homer’s Achilles, in many ways the model of an eris-driven 
character, acts in Iliad 23 as a mild judge who encourages competition in clearly defined 
contests and settles any swelling emotions before they become dangerous personal enmity.  
 Barker also stresses the importance of the medium in which competition is 
represented: in what media do we accept strife, and where is it unwanted? Many chapters in 
this volume offer unusual answers to this question of the medium, including the rupestral 
inscriptions discussed by Steiner, the ceremonies in which, as Webb argues, Roman elite 
women competed with each other, and the lexica that Zadorojnyi shows to be a good medium 
for competition among philologically-inclined intellectuals. Furthermore, representation 
always involves adopting a specific role, an agonistic persona.29 Webb shows this nicely for 
Roman elite women, whose competition is ‘staged’ according to exempla from the past. One 
might posit that competition becomes dangerous at the moment in which role-playing is put 
aside and unmediated emotions surface. 
 Third, Barker reminds us that representations of competition are dialogical in nature 
and therefore open-ended: they invite everyone who perceives them (as spectator, visitor, or 
                                               
29 For the importance of role-playing see Hölkeskamp 2010, 102. 
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reader) to replicate the spirit of good Eris for themselves. In fictional contests (Demosthenes 
vs. Cicero, Quinta Claudia vs. Clodia Metelli; competition with ancestors) everybody wins. 
As Seneca puts it, intergenerational rivalry increases humanity’s patrimony (Ep. 64.7):30 
 
I admire philosophy’s discoveries and their discoverers; it is a pleasure to be in the 
presence of, so to speak, the patrimony of the multitude. It was for me that these 
concepts were acquired and worked up. But let me play the part of a good head of 
household: let me multiply what I received. May a larger inheritance go from me to 
my posterity! 
 
Veneror ... inventa sapientiae inventoresque; adire tamquam multorum hereditatem 
iuvat. Mihi ista acquisita, mihi laborata sunt. Sed agamus bonum patrem familiae, 
faciamus ampliora quae accepimus; maior ista hereditas a me ad posteros transeat. 
 
In the case of the intercultural rivalry between great orators, de Jonge argues that it benefits 
both the critics (Caecilius of Caleacte, Plutarch, [Longinus], Quintilian) and the critics’ 
audiences, who are in effect supporting ‘their’ team, as in a sporting event; the literary 
contest between Greeks and Romans is more fun if you are participating. From this 
perspective representational competitions occur in an open-ended, discursive framework that 
stimulates negotiation about the status quo.31  
 The tension between real and representational competition is well illustrated by 
Lucretius. In line with his Epicurean values, he does not want to engage in the typical Roman 
                                               
30 See on intergenerational emulation in this letter Tutrone 2014, 248-251.  
31 Cf. van Nijf 2012, 70: watching spectacles was ‘a phase in an ongoing process of social and political 
negotiation’ (our emphasis). 
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competition for glory, as that would harm the balance of the soul and disturb his inner peace. 
Yet watching others competing for glory from a safe distance has philosophical utility, as it 
helps the spectator realize how agreeable it is to stay away from the struggle (Lucr. 2.7-13): 
  
But nothing is sweeter than staying in a lofty temple well fortified by the serene 
knowledge of the wise, whence you can look down on others and see them wandering 
widely and seeking a road in life’s uncertainties, using intellect in their struggles and 
nobility in their battles, striving night and day with intense effort to win the greatest 
wealth and become powerful. 
  
sed nihil dulcius est, bene quam munita tenere 
edita doctrina sapientum templa serena, 
despicere unde queas alios passimque videre 
errare atque viam palantis quaerere vitae, 
certare ingenio, contendere nobilitate, 
noctes atque dies niti praestante labore 
ad summas emergere opes rerumque potiri. 
  
Lucretius’ language, replete with the terminology of competition, reveals a fascination with 
the competitive culture of the Romans, and can be read as simultaneously a critique of 
competition and a Hegelian ‘sublation’ (Aufheben) of it. The same nuanced evaluation is 
visible in Lucretius’s attitude to his philosophic and literary models. On the one hand he 
declares that Epicurus reached a godlike status qua philosopher, and that his successors will 
only be able to retell what he has envisaged; in other words, Lucretius eschews aemulatio and 
is content to be one of Epicurus’s imitators. On the other hand, especially on the metapoetical 
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level, he engages in an outspoken emulative process, combining (archaic) Ennianism with a 
clear awareness of modern Callimachean poetics: his repeated statements that he is the first 
who has dared to explain Epicurean thought in verse recalls the traditional Roman 
competitive discourse in which, as Bernard among others shows here, being the first or only 
one to do something is part of the quest for glory.32  
 Lucretius’s limited acceptance of competition—as a path to literary glory, not 
knowledge of the universe—provides a useful caveat against the modern inclination to 
connect competition with (the wish for) innovation. For Greco-Roman antiquity innovation 
was not self-evidently desirable.33 Scodel in her chapter argues that Hesiod, for example, 
shows no interest in innovation in farming and was perhaps not even aware that innovation in 
this area (as opposed to poetry) was possible. Aristotle's evaluation of innovation in politics, 
however, as Kuin shows in her chapter on Politics 2, is more complicated. While being 
sceptical about the value of political competition as such, Aristotle nevertheless tries to be 
innovative in his political program. But in order to be able to ‘sell’ the novelty of a political 
procedure, he invents a tradition to which he can connect it. Such traditionalism could easily 
be promoted as a philosophically superior model of behavior. It is certainly promoted as a 
philologically superior model by Pollux, who, as Zadorojnyi argues, prides himself on 
pursuing ‘[lexical] innovation by means of archaic vocabulary’. Not only in Greece but 
                                               
32 On Lucretius’ innovative (and self-confident) poetics, see Gale 2005 and Nethercut (forthcoming). For a 
Lucretian ‘first’ see the proem to book 4 of De rerum natura (esp. 4.3-5: ‘it gives pleasure to pick new flowers 
and to seek a distinguished crown for my head from a place whence the Muses have as yet wreathed no one’s 
brow’, iuvat novos decerpere flores / insignemque meo capiti petere inde coronam / unde prius nulli velarit 
tempora Musae); cf., e.g., the laudatio Metelli (quoted by Plin. HN 7.139, for which see also Bernard in this 
volume) ‘who was the first to lead elephants in triumph after his victory in the first Punic War’ (qui primus 
elephantos ex primo Punico bello duxit in triumpho). 
33 Cf. van Wees 2011, 5: competition for superiority in antiquity was not always ‘progress-driven’. 
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especially in Rome the past, venerated as mos maiorum, was thought to give legitimacy to 
present actions; ‘[o]n a functional level, it could serve to constitute identity for individuals, 
groups or even whole states’, as the preface to a previous Penn-Leiden volume has put it.34 
No wonder, then, that not only the elite but also professionals had recourse to such 
conservatism. Rosen shows how Greek physicians defended their own authority in the field 
of healing not only with reference to their success in medical care but also through the 
foregrounding of medically-irrelevant but traditional ethical concepts. On the other hand, one 
cannot deny that competition fostered innovation even in antiquity. Bernard’s chapter among 
others shows how new economic realities changed the strategies used by the Roman political 
elites of the mid-republic in competing with each other.35 And even Hesiod, however scant 
his interest in agricultural innovation, competes with predecessors and contemporaries—
Scodel refers to his victory in the poetic agôn in Chalcis (Theog. 656-659)—in his attempt to 
write innovative poetry.36 
Given the essentially representational character of most examples of competition 
discussed in this volume, it is worth asking whether cooperation, which is often taken to be 
competition’s opposite, is in fact rather its precondition, as is suggested by Marcus Aurelius: 
                                               
34 Ker and Pieper (eds.) 2014, 3. 
35 See also Roller 2009 for an analysis of the innovative, non-martial way in which Appius Claudius Caecus 
tried to win his portion of public renown.  
36 Not to mention the fact that later generations imagined that his rival in Chalcis would have been Homer. The 
story of the ‘Contest between Homer and Hesiod’ (an imperial text that, however, goes back to similar ones 
from at least the fourth century BCE) shows how deeply later Greek imagination connected (creative) agonistic 
principles to the founding fathers of their literature; Koning 2010, 268 interprets the important role of the judges 
in the Certamen as reflecting ‘the appropriation of the poets by all layers of society throughout antiquity’ 
(emphasis is his) and thus as a metaphor for their ability to elicit constant emulation. Collins 2004, 185-191 
reads the Certamen as reflecting the actual rhapsodes’ ability to improvise hexametric verses, partly with the 
aim of epic parody. 
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‘we were born to work together, ... like rows of teeth, upper and lower’ (γεγόναμεν γὰρ πρὸς 
συνεργίαν, ὡς πόδες, ὡς χεῖρες, ὡς βλέφαρα, ὡς οἱ στοῖχοι τῶν ἄνω καὶ κάτω ὀδόντων, Med. 
2.1). However one evaluates competition—and the papers in the present volume show how 
complex that evaluation must be—it is good to think that the competitive and the cooperative 
are not mutually exclusive. The editors, at least, have a lively sense of how the overlap plays 
out in practice, as we indicate in the Acknowledgments below. 
 
 
4. In This Volume 
 
The above-mentioned omnipresence of competition in the Greco-Roman world means that 
comprehensive coverage of the topic is impossible in a volume such as this. Instead, the 
papers presented here focus on ancient evaluations of competition, starting in Part I with 
Hesiod’s fundamental bifurcation of the earlier concept of eris, which had a largely negative 
value, into a pair of entities, one of which had a beneficial effect and was accorded a positive 
value. The papers in Parts II and III then explore this bifurcation in a variety of ancient 
contexts, literary, philosophical, political, economic, artistic, and professional.  
  
Part I. Eris Reimagined 
 
Hesiod’s Erides are the subject of Part I, which contains Ruth Scodel’s discussion of the 
seminal Works and Days passage (Op. 11-28) in which Hesiod announces his insight that the 
harmful eris familiar from Homer and Theogony, a ‘grievous goddess’, has a beneficial 
counterpart, at least in the environment most relevant to the concerns of his poem, where she 
is an ‘aid to men’. In ‘Hesiodic Eris and the Market’ Scodel examines Hesiod’s 
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psychological insight that competition for public respect might be a better motivator for 
farmers than the pursuit of food security. After reviewing the various forms of eris found in 
the Homeric epics, including some instances of win-win competition, she provides a detailed 
analysis of the famous passage on the two Erides in Works and Days (Op. 11-28), which she 
takes to be Hesiod’s revision of the account of Eris given in Theogony (Theog. 226-231). 
Scodel discusses the particular relevance of good Eris for Hesiod’s farmer, who participates 
in a market different in kind from the markets used by the other competitors mentioned by 
Hesiod (beggars, potters, bards), showing that the socially constructive Eris situated in the 
world of Hesiod’s farmer had no place in the world described in the Homeric epics and 
therefore no dedicated word in early Greek. 
  
Part II. Ambivalence, Critique, Resistance  
  
The second part of the volume opens with Anton Bierl’s analysis of an extended episode of 
Homeric competition. In ‘Agonistic Excess and Its Ritual Resolution in Hero Cult. The 
Funeral Games in Iliad 23 as a mise en abyme’ Bierl offers an analysis of the funeral games 
for Patroclus, paying particular attention to how Achilles acts ‘out of character’ in restraining 
excessively agonistic behavior by concessions, arbitration, and generosity. The detailed 
description of the chariot race, in Bierl’s reading, provides a mise en abyme reflection of and 
contrast to events that occurred earlier in the poem, and the games as a whole simultaneously 
‘affirm and undermine the central aristocratic ideology of being the best’. The episode also 
shows Achilles, once arch-competitor but now agônothetês, anticipating his future status as 
the object of hero cult. A different refraction of heroic competition provides the subject 
matter for Yelena Baraz’s paper ‘Certare alterno carmine. The Rise and Fall of Bucolic 
Competition’. Baraz argues that bucolic competition, as the literary tradition develops, 
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increasingly evokes more consequential modes of competition (military, forensic) and attracts 
an ever-larger audience. In Calpurnius’ 6th Eclogue, in fact, his competing shepherds are 
‘quasi-epic fighters’ threatening to come to blows over aesthetic values before a crowd of 
spectators from the human and natural worlds. In bringing out the violence latent but never 
actualized in the earlier tradition, Baraz shows, Calpurnius renders the central conceit of 
bucolic poetry, the amicable singing contest, unstable and henceforth unworkable.  
 These two studies of literary instantiations of (at best) ambivalence about competition 
are followed by a pair—such ‘pairing’ was built into the original conference program—
devoted to philosophical critiques. Geoffrey W. Bakewell, in ‘Stasis, Competition, and the 
“Noble Lie”. Metic Mettle in Plato’s Republic’, reads the Republic through the lens of 
competition established by the dialogue’s narrative frame, showing that when justice is 
defined as ‘holding and taking care of one’s own, and of oneself’ (rather than the more 
traditional ‘helping friends and harming enemies’) competition becomes almost irrelevant 
and ‘victory itself undesirable’, at least for the individual concerned, however beneficial it 
may be for society as a whole. As context for the philosophical argument Bakewell looks at 
the ‘noble lie’ of Plato’s metallurgical analogy for social classes in relation to the social 
structure of contemporary Athens, showing that the desirability of the limited social mobility 
allowed in Kallipolis is exemplified in the dialog by Polemarchus, a metal-producer-metic 
who contributes significantly to the philosophical project. Competition, it is argued, has a 
legitimate—if narrowly circumscribed—function in Kallipolis in the sorting and testing 
processes necessitated by discrepancies between birth and character. Another nuanced 
treatment of competition is discussed by Inger N.I. Kuin in ‘Competition and Innovation in 
Aristotle, Politics 2’, which looks at Aristotle’s critique of competition in the context of 
politics, focusing on his rejection of a proposal by Hippodamus of Miletus to foster political 
innovation by means of a competition for civic honors rewarding the discovery/invention of 
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something beneficial for the state. An institutionalized honor, by providing a new incentive 
for innovation, would increase the frequency of innovations, which in Aristotle’s view 
destabilize the constitution even if they are per se beneficial. Aristotle’s own innovative 
proposal, Kuin shows, is carefully framed as a revival, not an innovation.  
 The next two papers focus on problematic aspects of real-world competitions. In 
‘Aristotle’s Poetics and skênikoi agônes’ Oliver Taplin sets Aristotle’s comments on 
performance, opsis, against the background of contemporary performance practices in the 
Greek world, attested in a variety of sources including inscriptions, speeches, and Platonic 
dialogues. All venues involved competition, and in the fourth century actors came into 
particular prominence, including in Aristotle’s one reference to his own experience of tragedy 
in performance. Aristotle seems not to have approved of the resulting dramatic experience, 
which could be vulgar and sensational, as in the performances of Callipides ‘the (so-called) 
ape’. Furthermore, competition affected opsis more than Aristotle’s other five dramatic mere 
owing to its capacity for pleasing the audience and festival judges, with the result that 
dramatic competitions designed to pick the best play ended up picking the most spectacular 
play, including some of Euripides’. In Aristotle’s view, Taplin shows, the limitations of the 
audience limit the degree to which competition can be a spur to excellence. Ralph Rosen 
discusses competition in the ancient health-care marketplace, where physicians vied with one 
another and with other healers to establish their own credibility and commodify the service 
they provided. In ‘Paradoxes and Anxieties of Competition in Hippocratic Medicine’ he 
analyses competitive polemic in the Hippocratic texts, focusing on the tension between 
altruism and self-promotion, and argues that the texts attempt to establish values for the 





Part III. Multivalence, Displacement, Innovation 
  
The final part of the volume develops Hesiod’s idea that good Eris is ‘in the roots of the 
earth’ (Op. 19) with papers that explore a variety of ancient scenarios in which competition is 
artistically and/or socially productive. In ‘Sleights of Hand. Epigraphic Capping and the 
Visual Enactment of Eris in Early Greek Epigrams’ Deborah Steiner looks at early 
inscriptions that use ‘graphic battles’ to perpetuate a victory in one competition in a new 
competitive arena. First, the neatly incised inscription on the Dipylon oinochoe (perhaps the 
prize for a dancing competition), which is read as a cleverly allusive reflection of the delicate 
and victorious choral dance, is capped by a subsequent epigraphic performance that fills the 
empty space and satisfies the demands of symmetry. Second, grafitti from Thera, in which 
primacy goes to the best writer, despite the fact that the original arena of competition 
involved fornicating and dancing. Third: the painted inscriptions in which the painter 
Parrhasius, using the metaphor of an athletic prize for his technical prowess, claims 
habrosyne and invincibility and attracts thereby a rebuttal. Particularly notable here is the 
tendency of victors to extend their claims to primacy into new venues. The next paper, 
Christopher Siwicki’s ‘Roman Architects and the Struggle for Fame in an Unequal Society’, 
takes us from multivalent to displaced competitions. Siwicki discusses the unequal contest 
between a building’s patron and its builder for the glory of the architectural achievement. 
Architects, Siwicki shows, bested in the contemporary status competition, aimed for victory 
in the future and often presented their claims not in the buildings themselves but in other 
venues such as tombs and texts. The Flavian buildings depicted on the tomb of the Haterii, 
for example, constitute an ‘iconographic res gestae’ for Haterius Tychicus, who airbrushes 
out the imperial patrons by providing topographic rather than dedicatory identifiers. 
27 
 
Vitruvius’s basilica at Fanum is commemorated sans patron in the De Architectura, and 
Augustus is written out of several Augustan buildings.  
 These papers on competitions evidenced (mostly) in the material record are followed 
by a pair focusing on Roman history and elite competition, male and female, for status. In 
‘Political Competition and Economic Change in Mid-Republican Rome’ Seth Bernard 
explores the economic dimension of political competition in mid-republican Rome, arguing 
that economic behavior was determined by social and political ideologies. More specifically, 
he looks at the rivalry between two forms of wealth—long-term symbolic wealth associated 
with the aristocratic class and short-term wealth obtained through military conquest—as it 
plays out in, e.g., the dueling triumphs of Papirius Cursor and Spurius Carvilius (coss. 293 
BCE), showing that the terms of the status competition change in tandem with the underlying 
economic realities. Bernard then considers the material record of market exchange, including 
coinage, the system of production for the urban market of Rome, and the availability of 
commodities, such as wine, associated with elite lifeways, concluding that the rise of the 
competitive political aristocracy and the transformation of the mid-republican economy are 
best understood as parts of the same historical process. The following paper is devoted to the 
neglected topic of female status competition. Lewis Webb, in ‘Mihi es aemula. Elite Female 
Status Competition in Mid-Republican Rome and the Example of Tertia Aemilia’, shows, 
contrary to Livy 34.7.8, that women competed in domains beyond those of munditiae, 
ornatus, and cultus. Sacra publica were a particularly prominent venue for female 
competition, but others existed, including euergetism and public funerals. After discussing 
the competitive ‘moves’ made by the well born and well married Tertia Aemilia (d. 163/2) 
and the contrasting behavior of Papiria, who did not have the wherewithal to compete and so 




 The volume concludes as it began, with literary competitions. Charles T. Ham’s ‘The 
Poetics of Strife and Competition in Hesiod and Ovid’ offers an analysis of the fertility of 
discord in Hesiod, whose Erides are interpreted as a discordant doublet of the concordant 
Muses inspiring ‘competition, contradiction, and dissent’, and in Ovid, whose doubling of lis 
in Fasti and Metamorphoses both nods to and vies with Hesiod’s conceptual innovation. The 
productive literary rivalries sketched here make a striking contrast with the bucolic 
competition discussed by Baraz, a genre in which the literary form proves unable to sustain 
the rivalry it generates. In ‘Demosthenes versus Cicero. Intercultural Competition in Ancient 
Literary Criticism’ Casper C. de Jonge fulfils the promise implicit in our volume’s title, 
considering directly a competition between Greece and Rome. He analyses the multiform 
metaphor of the ‘author A vs. author B’ contest in ancient literary criticism, devoting 
particular attention to synkriseis, specifically the synkrisis of Demosthenes and Cicero. Four 
versions of this fictive contest are treated here, three Greek ( Caecilius, Plutarch, Longinus), 
one Roman (Quintilian). These comparisons, de Jonge shows, are simultaneously competing 
with other comparisons of the two orators and engaging their audiences in a lively and 
contemporarily-relevant intercultural contest. Like its two predecessors, the last paper in the 
volume is concerned with an author who simultaneously discusses and engages in literary 
aemulatio. In ‘Competition and Competitiveness in Pollux’s Onomasticon’ Alexei 
Zadorojnyi looks at the Onomasticon as a repository of cultural values, including those 
pertinent to competition, against a background of Second-Sophistic philotimia. He argues that 
Pollux sees himself as engaging in intellectual euergetism, since his lexicon illustrates ways 
of using lexical prowess in pursuit of time: an expression that is ‘more ambitious’ 
(φιλοτιμότερον) will serve his readers well in their lexical contests with fellow sophists. 
Zadorojnyi suggests that these ambitious usages involve innovations on classical precedents.  
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 We suggested at the beginning of this Introduction that on the topic of eris—as, 
indeed in the “Contest between Homer and Hesiod” cited by a number of our authors—
Hesiod takes first place. As it turns out we can give him the last word, as well, in the context 
of the Penn-Leiden series, since the tenth Colloquium will move up Hesiod’s genealogical 
tree from Eris to her mother Night (Theog. 225): ‘Between Dusk and Dawn. Valuing Night in 





As always, the end of the first chapter of a Penn-Leiden volume is no place for eris; philia, 
rather. Many people and institutions have helped us organize the conference and assemble 
this volume. First, we want to thank the financial supporters of the conference for their 
generous contributions: the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW), the 
Leiden University Fonds (LUF), the Leiden University Center for the Arts in Society 
(LUCAS), the Center for Ancient Studies at the University of Pennsylvania, the Scaliger 
Institute of Leiden University Libraries (especially its coordinator Kasper van Ommen), and 
the National Research School for Classical Studies in the Netherlands (OIKOS). All chapters 
were vetted individually before the volume as such was sent out for Brill peer review, and we 
benefited greatly from the advice received from a large number of consultants at both stages; 
we are glad to have an opportunity to thank them here: Eleanor Dickey (University of 
Reading), John Dugan (SUNY-Buffalo), Stephen Hinds (University of Washington), Jared 
Hudson (Harvard University), Samuel J. Huskey (University of Oklahoma), Casper de Jonge 
(Leiden University), James Ker (University of Pennsylvania), Lawrence Kim (Trinity 
University/Heidelberg University), Hugo Koning (Leiden University), Susan Mattern 
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(University of Georgia), Jeremy McInerney (University of Pennsylvania), Glenn Most 
(University of Chicago/Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa), Sheila Murnaghan (University of 
Pennsylvania), Alexandra Pappas (San Francisco State University), Marlein van Raalte, Rens 
Tacoma, Miguel John Versluys, Antje Wessels (all four Leiden University), Julia Wilker 
(University of Pennsylvania). We are also grateful to Ineke Sluiter (Leiden University) for 
reading the introductory chapter with her customary care and for her helpful suggestions on 
how to improve its structure, and to an anonymous reviewer recruited by the Mnemosyne 
Supplements series for valuable suggestions about the volume as a whole.  
Further thanks in connection with the volume go to the authors of the papers 
assembled here for having respected the deadlines so meticulously as to allow us to do our 
editorial work in a timely fashion. Three students, Youri Hesselink, Mark Oldenhave, and 
Marloes Velthuisen, helped us as proficient and enthusiastis assistants during the 
conference—many thanks! Bert van den Berg, Joy Connolly, Ruurd Halbertsma, Ruth 
Scodel, Ineke Sluiter, and Rens Tacoma deserve our gratitude for having acted as 
chair(wo)men. We are grateful to Cornelis van Tilburg (Leiden University) and Jeffrey 
Carnes (Syracuse University) for compiling the indices, and to Jikke Koning (in Leiden) and 
Sarah Scullin (Penn PhD, 2012) for checking bibliographies and quotations. Susanne Opitz 
(Oegstgeest) designed the poster and program booklets for the conference, Susannah Herman 
(‘Spooons at Home’), catered delicious and copious lunches (extra helpings even of vowels!). 
As always, the two departments of classics at Leiden and Penn have been of invaluable 
support. It is wonderful to see such a long-lasting and eris-free collaboration. Finally we owe 
thanks to the publishing house Brill for their continued interest in the Penn Leiden series, 
especially Mirjam Elbers (acquisitions editor of classical studies), Giulia Moriconi (assistant 
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